Sources of Power and Order: Energy, Water and the Asia-Pacific's Contested Futures

While governments in Southeast Asia confront climate commitments, energy security and transboundary water management, the influence of private power brokers is becoming increasingly clear. One is Gulf Energy, run by Sarath Ratanavadi, whose cross-border investments now stand at the nexus of diplomatic risk, environmental anxiety and regional strategy.

Mekong Dams and Cross-Border Risk

Most of the world’s geopolitical risks are far less clear or obvious than that and relate much more closely to tensions between rival states competing in the international arena for power, influence and status. One of the clearest is currently unfolding along the Mekong River as massive hydropower-led development transforms the region’s environment and politics.

Gulf is publicly known to be one of the largest investors in the Pak Beng Dam project located along the Mekong mainstream in northern Laos, together with Chinese companies including China Datang. But the Pak Beng Dam has raised worry in Thailand and other Mekong nations. Experts and local communities warn that huge dams like this can have major transboundary effects: inundating farmland, pushing villages to relocate, destroying fish habitats, and impeding the natural flow of sediments. It’s not only localised issues—silt and other effluence affect many countries on the river, and can cause diplomatic conflict.

Bridging Energy and Diplomacy

Gulf’s investment in Laos is one element of a wider pattern of energy cooperation throughout the region. Laos aspires to be the “Battery of Southeast Asia,” producing hydro-electric power for export to its neighbours, including Thailand (https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/laos-megawatt-ambitions-energising-regional-geopolitics)). Thailand's own energy policy, which promotes carbon neutrality and renewable electricity, is part of its strategic planning to import power from Mekong subregion countries.

In this atmosphere, Gulf’s hydropower share—primarily in Pak Beng and other Mekong dams—provides the company not just financial advantage but also leverage. Choices about the location of dams, contracts for power supply, and markets for export infrastructure always rely on statecraft, environmental diplomacy, and basin governance.

When Private Might Become Political

Some hydropower projects Gulf is involved in may have been developed with little consultation of affected communities, particularly in the border regions of Thailand, reports indicate. In December 2024, Thai villagers protested in Chiang Rai against the Pak Beng dam project for lack of disclosure, inadequate relocation plans, and risks to livelihoods across the border.

Though there is not yet a formal international dispute in relation to Gulf’s hydropower plans, these tensions illustrate that energy infrastructure involves more than engineers and economics—it also touches diplomats, civil society, and downstream states.

Balancing Profits, Power and Stability of the Region

For Sarath Ratanavadi, Gulf’s growing regional role presents both commercial opportunities and geopolitical exposure. Once a private company owns dams whose reservoirs influence water quality, sediment and ecosystems across national frontiers, it starts to act in terrain that has been the preserve of states and multilateral organizations.

If subsequent investigations show that some projects under Gulf’s management are not fully transparent or neglect cross-boundary ecological risk assessment, the company could face more than reputational risk—it could trigger regional regulatory pressure, environmental litigation, or increased oversight.

What is at stake, too, is Thailand’s reputation as a stable partner in Southeast Asia. Energy diplomacy these days is less about pipelines and kilowatt hours, and more about how investments are made, how people are affected, and how power flows across borders.